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Abstract:  
How does freedom of association shape social cohesion, individual 
behavior and welfare, in heterogeneous populations? To answer this question, we 
develop a theoretical model and conduct experiments with human subjects. We 
study a network formation and action choice game in which individuals benefit 
from selecting the same action as their neighbours. However, one group of 
individuals prefers to coordinate on one action, while the rest prefers to coordinate 
on the other action.  
There exist multiple equilibria, which come in two forms: one, integration 
where the network is fully connected, and every player conforms to the same action 
and two, segregation where the network is composed of two complete components 
and all members of the same component select the same action, which is different 
from what members of the other component select. We also show that social 
welfare is (uniquely) maximized with full integration and conformity on the 
majority’s action.  
In the experiment we observe that clear segregation and diversity: 
individuals of different preferences separate themselves completely and within the 
‘network component’ choose their preferred action. We find that this result is 
robust, as we lower the costs of linking. To understand the role of freedom of 
association, we then turn to a setting where the network is exogenous. Again there 
exist a variety of equilibria displaying conformism and diversity, but in the 
experiment we observe that subjects almost always choose the action preferred by 
the majority. We therefore conclude that the freedom of association sustains 
diversity in a population. We discuss potential theoretical explanations – based on 
dynamic stability and team reasoning – for the critical role of linking.  
 
